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COMMENT:
THE IMPACT OF MAJOR CHANGES
BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IN THE LAW
AFFECTING CLAIM SCOPE
Gerald Sobel, Esq.t

I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

I would like to consider the title of this Symposium, which
addresses the past, present, and future of the Federal Circuit. Consider how the court's changes in the law of claim construction affect competition, patent policy, and procedure.
The parties in these cases, of course, are a patentee and an alleged infringer. Usually they are competitors. So we are also talking about competition, either with a copy of the patentee's product
or a somewhat different product that is close enough to the patentee' s product to have been accused of infringement.
As Mr. Filardi stated, the Federal Circuit adopted in Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc. the new rule that claim construction
was a matter of law for the court.' Accordingly, claim construction suddenly ceased to be a fact issue for the jury on which expert
testimony was heard. In the past, the jury would resolve the conflicting views of the experts. The reasons given for the new rule
were to promote the policies of clear notice to competitors and
predictability of a determination of infringement. The Supreme
Court essentially went along.2
Under Markman, one ordinarily expects a narrower claim
scope than one would have gotten from a jury. Of course, a nart Partner, Kaye Scholer LLP, New York City.
Edward V. Filardi, Remarks at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Center for Law, Technology and the Arts Symposium: The Past, Present, and Future of the
Federal Circuit (Nov. 14, 2003) (transcript on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
2 517 U.S. 370,387-88 (1996).
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rower scope is good for alleged infringers, but is not good for patentees. It is good for encouraging competition with small differences from the patented product during the life of the patent.
What about the effect on the basic policy of the patent system: the
incentive to innovate? The Markman rule is not good as an incentive to encourage innovation, because it reduces the patent reward.
If one shifts to the discussion here about predictability of
claim constructions and reversal rates, whether they are thirty percent, or one-third or more, that level suggests that reading claims
is not all that predictable a task. On the other hand, as Judge Michel 3 pointed out, there are a very large number of summary judgment decisions that come up to the court, which means that cases
are being disposed of on motion without a trial.4 The Supreme
Court thinks that is synonymous with judicial efficiency, a positive
development.
The typical Markman procedure of a pretrial claim construction hearing is a dramatic change and, of course, previously did
not exist. There are also a lot of newly articulated rules of construction. These create a whole set of tasks for practitioners and a
whole new way of practicing.
In addition, I think Mr. Filardi and Mr. Griffith are both correct in that the use of dictionaries is a swing of the pendulum in
favor of patentees, because it offers the opportunity for a broader
reading than say perhaps the discredited Gentry case where the
focus was on the embodiments in the specification.
My main point is that the flexibility that the jury had is gone.
The net effect, in general, is to narrow claim scope.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The doctrine of equivalents is a better example of my point
that the trend of the development of the law in the Federal Circuit
has been to narrow patent scope. The narrowing has proceeded in
several steps. First, the Federal Circuit began, in the early 1980s,
talking about the doctrine of equivalents in terms of "the claimed
invention as a whole." 6 Second, equivalency was narrowed by the
Circuit to the "element by element" rule.7 Third, the en banc ques3 The Honorable Paul Michel, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
4 The Honorable Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations: Guiding Principles as NavigationalAides, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 757,765-66 (2004).
5 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1477-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
6 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled
by Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
7 See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 883 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed Cir. 1987)
("[Tlhe district court correctly relied on an element-by-element comparison to conclude that
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tions in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co. asked
whether the doctrine of equivalents was not a jury question, but
rather a question of equity in the discretion of the trial court.8 The
answers might have further narrowed the doctrine, except the majority for that position could not be mustered. We ended up, at
that point, with essentially the same "substantially the same function, way, result," or "insubstantial difference" rule that we had
before. 9
Prosecution estoppel, of course, is an aspect of the doctrine of
equivalents which bars its application where the equivalent was
surrendered in prosecution. In a fourth step in this history, the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson created a presumption which
eased application of estoppel to block equivalence. The Supreme
Court held that where the file history did not provide the reason for
an amendment, the presumption was that an estoppel arose.' 0
The prosecution estoppel doctrine was also involved in the
decisions of the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court in Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Prior to Festo it was a
"flexible" rule." Festo, at the Federal Circuit level, created a fifth
change. The court adopted a new rule completely barring equivalence for claims that had been narrowed for reasons relating to patentability. 12 The Supreme Court rejected that rule, but, in a sixth
step, created a new set of rules that narrowed estoppel from the
pre-Festo flexible rule. The Court created a presumption of surrender for narrowed claims that could be overcome if the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of application or only tangentially related to the amendment, or if there was "some other reason" why the equivalent could not reasonably have been described. 13 The Federal Circuit is now fleshing out the procedures.
In what may be viewed as a seventh step, the procedural impact so
far, based on the remand in Festo to the Federal Circuit, 14 is that
two of the three ways to overcome the presumption which follows
there was no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.").
8 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc), affid in part & rev 'd in part on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
9 Id. at 1518-19.
'0 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 (1997).
1 See Hughes Aircraft Co., 717 F.2d at 1362 (rejecting the prosecution estoppel doctrine
as a "wooden application of estoppel").
12 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo I), 234 F.3d 558 (Fed
Cir. 2000), vacated by Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722
(2002).
13 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo 11), 535 U.S. 722, 73840(2002).
14 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo Hl), 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
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from the narrowing amendment (tangential and "some other reason") require a decision limited to the prosecution record. Evidence may be taken on the third (unforseeability). I believe it is
up to the court to decide whether the prosecution history estoppel
presumption will be overcome.' 5 The vitiation doctrine surfaced in
some older cases. The Federal Circuit called it "specific exclusion." Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos.' 6 was the leading
case in that group. The idea was that if something was specifically
excluded in the claim it would not be an infringing equivalent.
The doctrine was hard to distinguish from the exclusion of everything not literally claimed-which would bar all equivalents. The
court retreated from that position in Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v.
U.S. Surgical Corp.17 The court explained in Ethicon EndoSurgery that, looking back, the holdings in the "specific exclusion"
cases should be understood as situations where, on the facts, no
reasonable jury could have found equivalence.' 8 In other words,
the "specific exclusion" principle was abandoned. Perhaps we will
have pretrial prosecution estoppel hearings as we now have Markman hearings. Certainly, we will have partial summary judgment
motions as a result.
Once again, the net effect of all of this is to narrow the scope
of the patent. Again, that is good for the alleged infringer, but not
good for the patentee. It is good for the kind of competition you
get from copying and close designing around. It is not good from
the perspective of the incentive to create unobvious inventions. In
the longer term, a more dramatic kind of competition comes from
invention than from close copying. In short, I think the doctrine of
equivalents is a particularly interesting manifestation of the trend
toward narrowing patent scope and reducing the related incentive
to innovate.
CONCLUSION
My closing plea to the court of appeals judges is that they pay
more attention to the patent as a reward for invention and as an
incentive to invent.

'"

Festo I1, 344 F.3d. at 1370-7 1.

Is

Id. at 1317-19.

16 16 F.3d 394 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
17 149 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

